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Foreword 
Reports are prepared by engineers in U.S. nuclear power piar.*;: for u vide 
range of component failures and similar occurrences. I hi- pr-vcii- reporting re-
quirements are specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coi?.-issicn£ Regulatory 
Guide 1.16. Until 197i*t such reports were termed Abnorssai Occurrence reports. 
but since then the term "Abnormal Occurrence reports" has beer, reserved for 
those occurrences which have seme safety significance. What were earlier tersed 
"Abnormal Occurrences" are now as a general class, t erred Reportable- Occurrences. 
The reports are published by the US NRC. The work here ccr.cerr.r a study cf 
"Abnormal Occurrence Reports", using the pre 19?** definition and data up tc and 
including spring 197^• The data cover a wide range of occurrence types. In. par-
ticular they give component failure data mostly of relatively uni-portar.t indi-
vidual component failures, such as miscalibration of a single redundant instru-
ment, but in sone cases for failures of sorse engineering significance. The re-
forts are much less forssal than those required for reliability data oanks. They 
give considerably more background information concerning t'.ie cause ard natur--
of failures than do reliability data banks; and also much -nore information 
concerning consequences and interrelationships between separate failures. 
For this reason, the reports provide very valuable information, which is 
relevant not only to the study of nuclear power plant reliability, but also 
provides insight into the way failures can occur in many different kinds of 
process plant. 
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A STUDY OF ABNGSKAL OCCURRENCE REPORTS 
latroductiori 
An earlier study (Ris^-K-17^2) attested to evaluate the rcle of design 
etr<*rs in nuclear power plant reliability. The results of that study showed 
that design error plays a large role ir. cover plant failure: a.-.d the surprising 
result that an unexpectedly large proportion of failure Incidents involve sev-
eral independent component failures. 
Several questions arose as a result of that earlier work. Gr.e would ~x-
ptet- that the role of design error diminishes for individual plants as they 
grow older. It was decided to investigate the senier.ce of afcr.or.Tial occurrence 
reports from individual reactors over a number of years. 
Another question is the extent tc which separate failures in rnulti-failure 
incidents contribute significantly to the failure consequence. It is possible 
that several of the failures within an incident have no direct bearing on the 
extent of failure consequences. They may play an incidental rather than crucial 
par* in the failure sequence. 
The remaining area of interest for this study is the problem of common mode 
failure. The importance of common sod** failure was established earlier, but the 
only datum obtained was a gross figure for the proportion of failures involving 
common mode effects. Results of the coisror. 20de failure study performed here 
are published separately (Ris2-K-l826). 
A major eleaent in motivating this study, was the desire to discover the 
weak points in existing techniques of failure sode analys:s of process plant, 
and to develop the background information for improving those techniques. There 
are some types of failure for which no systematic analysis technique exists, 
for erample 
- wiring errors involving incorrect interconnections 
- "system design" errors in control systems 
- mechanical blockage and jamming problems arising from loose parts 
- errors in written procedures 
- human eri*ors due to confusion between procedures or misinterpretation 
of operating situation. 
All of these problems involve complex conmon mode effects, and it is 
important to discover to what extent they are important ir. practice. 
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The procedure in this study has been to take individual incident reports, 
and to classify then according to fixed criteria. The nature o; the data prevents 
one from obtaining good statistical data with known significance, but it is 
felt that qualitative, and "order of Magnitude" conclusions can be drawn from 
the results. 
Choic* of data 
The data used for this study is abnormal occurrence data submitted to the 
BSdC by operators of light water reactors. The reason for this choice is that 
the iaforaation is readily available, there are consistent criteria for reporting 
the data (reporting is required by law}, and the quality of the reporting is 
generally excellent. The information differs from that usually available in 
reliability data banks, in that complete failure incidents are described, often 
involving several individual component failures. 
The choice of reactors for this study was determined by the availability 
of records for a period of years. Records from the earliest years of reactor 
operation were however not available to the author. There has been a change in 
style of reporting over a number of years, and this has to some extent negated 
the value of the data as a record of "design error" evolution. 
Classification of occurrences 
For each occurrence report, the date, six month period lumber (from 
reactor start up), operating state at the time of occurrence, and method of 
failure discovery were recorded. Most failures are detected during surveillance 
testing, some via special inspections, but many are discovered as "actual" 
failure incidents which interfere with plant operation. In many cases a failed 
condition existed over a considerable period, but the plant state recorded 
was nevertheless the plant state at the time the failure was discovered. In 
virtually all cases it is true that a latent failure, discovered during sur-
veillance or special testa, has existed while the plant was operating. 
Kach individual component failure was recorded separately for each inci-
dent, and in some cases there were several failures contributing to the inci-
dent. 
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OP Plant operational, generating power. 
SU Plant was in start up phase. 
SD Plant was in shut down phase. 
Cfi Plant was in cold shut down state. 
SF Plant was shut down for refuelling. 
Table 1. Classification of plant states at the time of failure discovery. 
ACT "Actual" incident - occurs during normal operation of 
component. 
SOB Failure discovered during surveillance testing. 
PM Failure discovered during post maintenance testing of 
the failed component. 
COM Failure discovered during coaaissioning tests. 
SI Failure discovered during special inspection, as a 
result of suspected incipient failure, or as a result 
of information from other plants. 
SO Failure discovered during start up testing. 
Table 2. Classification of "mode of discovery" of failures. 
In a study such as this, which is concerned with the cause of failure, it 
is important to define the term component failure carefully. A failure is deemed 
to have occurred, if a component is incapable of fulfilling its function, in 
spite of the fact that inputs such as power supplies, control signals, mechanical 
support, etc. are within the limits specified for the component. Failures due 
to incorrect input are judged to be consequent failures, and were recorded for 
interest, but were excluded from statistical analyses. Failures due »o environ-
mental changes were recorded as component failures, unless the environmental 
change was a result of some earlier component failure in which case they were 
classified as consequent failures, and again omitted from statistical analyses. 
The degree to which a plant is divided into "components" also affects the 
number of component failures recorded. In this study, a standard level of div-
- < t -
islon into components was used, as expressed by table J. Hoverer, where a 
component was part of a larger component or subsystem, this faet was recorded 





























































































































































































Table 3B. Mechanical component coding. 
Event sequence 
The structure of event sequences has a dirsot bearing on the way in which 
failure records are interpreted and used in later failure node analyses. Failures 
were classified as spontaneous, gradual, aiaoperation, latent or consequent. 
A spontaneous failure is on* which occurs at the tin of the incident and 
serves to start the incident. The classification of "gradual" failures was 
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as spontaneous, for example slow leaks which are detected after they tare caused 
farther damage. 
latent failures occur in components which are callod on to work intermit-
tently. Such components may exist in a failed state, which i« "revealed" when 
the conponent is tested or is called on to operate. 
Kisoperation failures are those which occur when a component or operater 
is called on to carry out such operation, and which occur while the conponent 
or operator is carrying out the operation. 







table •>. Classification of failures according to how they are 
triggered. 
farther classification of "consequent" failures is possible - Input 
failures (I) fi mi i1 failures), overload or stress failures (secondary fail-
ures) (0), and direct effect failures (D). Such classification is often Bade 
la failure node analysis studies. Bat such classification was Bade only for 
coaaon node failures, 1B this study. 
Symbolic description of the different kinds of failure are shown in fig. 
1 to *» (see KUe Report Kise-H-17->3) • For each of the different kinds of fall-
ure, a different nodel is required to describe failure probability. 
as a result of the study, sone of the Initial ideas on classification of fail-
ures were revised, and these ideas, which were net used in the study itself. 
are given i n Appendix 1. 
One of the important objectives of thin study was to ohmene the neafter 
of failure events occurring in actual failure sequences. For this purpose, 
failures detected by testing were ignored. Mao, several failures occurring 
within similar components due to a common node effect, were treated as single 
failures. Consequent failures which were certain to occur, given earlier fail-
ures, is the sequence were ignored. But consequent failures which involved some 
probability factor, such as destruction of component« by Impinging stsaa Jets, 
were counted as separate failures. 
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Coamon mode and coupled failures 
As part of the study of multiple failures, a study was made of common 
mode and coupled failures in similar plant components. The results of this 
sttriy are iresented in a separate report. 
* 
Failure cause 
The objective in this study has been to come as close as possible to the 
original cause of failure. Failure causes are classified at two levels, as 
shown in table ->. The second level of classification is much less certain tha:. 
the first. In the ease of operator and maintenance errors, the subclaseification 
was completely experimental. 
To maintain consistency of cause classification it is important to have 
clear criteria. An error warn considered a design error if it was explicitly 
described as much in the abmrmal occurrence report, if it was one of a long 
series of similar failures with very high failure rate, or if the design was 
modified as a result of the failure. A similar criterion was used for classi-
fying procedural errors. Failures were classed as operator errors if this was 
explicitly stated in the abnormal occurrence report, and similarly for main-
tenance and installation errors. (This can lead to underestimation of operator errors) 
Random component failures were recorded in those cases where a simple 
standard mechanism of component failure was involved e.g. bearing leakage, 
shorting of a relay coil etc., and in which no excessive grouping of failures 
of a similar kind occurred. 
In some cases, more than one cause of component failure could be discovered. 
In other cases, it was difficult to judge between two alternative failure causes. 
In these cases, fractional contributions to failure classes were recorded, an 
equal fraction to each contributing cause. 
In many cases, the same kind ef failure occurred in the same component 
several times in the course of a few years. These cases were counted as single 
failures in determining relative importance of different failure causes (though 
all incidents were counted in determining coaaon mode failure proportions). If 
one does not count failure causes in this way, then sone frequently occurring 
failure types come to dominate the distribution of causes. The proportion of 
design error failures, in particular, becomes Inflated. 
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Cause subclass 
C Random component failure 
S Design error 
0 Operator error 
H Mechanical 
E Electrical 
0 Problem unknown at design time 
C Complex system interactions 
1 Interdisciplinary problems 
0 Oversight 
K Coiiiniication problems 
Z Calculation, sizing problems 
S Component selection problem 
0 Omission 
X Unnecessary extra operation 
*" wrong target of operation 
E Error in amount of operation 
ft Error in operation sequence 
P wrong procedure used 
J Judgement of quantity 
C Communication problem 
R tack of recognition of danger 
situation 
H Precognition of danger situation 
Table *t. Coding for causes of failure. 
-13-
Cause Cause subclass 
H Maintenance error 
I Installation error 
P Procedure error 
F Fabrication fault 
? Cause unknown 
A Adjustment (of instruments, switches) 
0 Omission of step in installation, 
repair 
P Positioning of component 
H Misuse of component, handling 
problem 
B activation of other equipment not 
under repair 
C Choice of component to install. 
repair 
1 Interchange of two components, 
cables etc. 
Quality of join 
Omission of subprocedure 
Extra control, checking required 
Procedure open to misinterpretation 
Effect unknown before failure 
Procedure wrong 




Abnormal occurrence reports frem ri«« reactera ven classified for react«« 
with start up dates in 196a , 196}, 1*7, 1969, and 197o. Abnormal occurrence 
reports were generally available to the aether only rroa tk* later years of 
reactor operation (fros 1969 onward}. 
Both the number and character of abnormal occurrences vane* greatly froa 
reactor to reactor. The eariatiaa coald ham aria« froa the differaat emmntity 
and type of equipment at the realtor plant, as veil as dir ferene« in reliability 
of components. Hoverer, it was hoped that bj concentrating on the eroaortion 
of occurrence« of different types, atsnirgful coatlaaions could he draan. 
Ås can be seen froa fig. 7 not too aach significance can he attached to 
the actual nuabers of abaoraal occurrence reports for successive years. 
In addition to abnormal occurrence reports, aoae "unusual m a t " reports 
ware included in the analysis, where the reports concern safety related or 
pressure boundary equipment (see BSLK safety (aide 13.2. for definition of 
abnorasl occurrence, unusual event). 
There say be soae Missions of abnormal occurrence reports for the reactors 
studied, though where possible records were checked against semiannual operating 
reports. On the assumption that omissions are randomly distributed, the effect 
on proportions of failure' types should not be too iaportant. 
Is all there were 67, 2<t, 33, 1W. 75 abaoraal occurrences for the respect-
ive reactors. 
Causes of failure 
Fig. 8 and 9 show bow the various causes of failure behave as plants grew 
older. No significant trends can be detected, the proportion of failures due 
to respective causes seen if anything aore or less constant. Bat such more 
data would be required, before trends could he detected beneath the nodes) 
variations in the data. As has been observed in esrlier studies, design error 
seems to be the dominant cause of failure, followed by random component failure. 
Table 5 gives the numbers of failures attributed to particular cause classes, 
for each of the reactors studied. The pattern ia aore or leas constant, appart 
froa an unusually high proportion of failures attributed to eaintanaace errora, 
for one of the older reactors, and a coaplete lack of reported operator errors 
for one reactor. 
The classification of secondary causes for design, operator, procedure, and 
aaintenanee errors are shown in tables 6 to 9. Tot classifications bare are 
sxptrinental, and should be regarded as indicative rather than definite. Sash 
slaaslfieations can be used as a guide to qualitative studies of failure causes. 
INSUFFICIENT DATA 
I t 
l i i l 1 
• « a u w 
Fig. > PROPORTION OF OPERATOR AND 
PROCEDURE ERRORS 
20 22 2* 
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Table 5. Cause classes for component failures. 
^»••epsj iPSH 
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Conponeat selection 14 
Oversight 17 
Error due to effect unknown at 
design tine 25 
Sizing, dimensioning error 13 
Error due to lack of recognition of 
conplex systea interactions 7 
Error due to connunication probleas 1 
Error with cause unknown or unrecorded 22 
Table 6. Design error secondary causes 
( Based on 147 occurrences) 
% of error 
Omission of a step, operation or 
procedure (reason for oaiasion 
unknown) **9 
Wrong procedure used 16 
lack of recognition of situation 7 
Misrecognition of situation 2 
Error in operation sequence ** 
Operation applied to wrong target 
component *t 
Error of judgement of asount 2 
Error due to CIIIHMIideations problem, 
lack of coBflunication h 
Error in aaount of adjustaent 2 
Error due to unknown cause 9 
Table 7* Secondary causes of operator errors. 
(Based on 77 occurrences) 
Error due to oadssion of step 
H Error due to oaiasion, because 
effect was unknown at the tise 
the procedure was defined 16 
If Efcoeedure was open to Misinterpretation, 
unclear 7 
F Wrong test frequency specified 2 
V Wrong procedure specified 2 
C Extra control required - procedure 
does not contain sufficient cross 
checks 6 
? Error with unknown cause 1** 
Table 8. Secondary causes of errors in procedures. 
(Based on Mt occurrences) 
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A Problem with adjustment of instnmnts, 
lindt, torque switches ate. 
V Wrong operation carried out, or 
right operation carried oat wrongly, 
due to lack of knowledge or expertise 
B Spurious activation of other equipment 
while carrying out testa or repair 
I Interchange of two cables 
0,0 Omission of operation, doe either to 
oversight or to ignorance of requirement 
P Srror positioning component 
<i Probleas of quality in soldering, 
welding 
B Error due to lack of recognition of 
situation 
C Krror in choice of which component 
to repair 
S Breach of safety regulations 
1 Error due to unidentified causes 2$ 
Table 9, Secondary cause« of installation and maintenance 
errors. 
' (Based on W occurrences) 
16 
-23-
It is possible to make some qualitative comments on the results. 
A lsrge proportion of design errors involve effects which were unknown 
before failure occurred. Many failures ot this type occur repeatedly, the 
same component sometimes being repaired several times before the failure is 
correctly diagnosed. Such incidents underline the value of abnormal occurrence 
reporting. 
Another large group of design errors involve inappropriate choice, of 
materials, or especially, of instruments. Problems of this kind can be reduced 
by qualification testing and standardisation, activities which are receiving 
a great deal of attention from nuclear engineers. 
By far the largest proportion of operator errors involve omission or 
oversight, involving just a single type of plant operations. By their nature, 
such errors are relatively easy to forsee, and analyse, even in the cases 
where several components are affected in a common mode fashion. More serious 
are the errors due to lack of recognition of dangerous situations, misrecog-
nition, application of inappropriate procedures or application of correct 
procedures to the wrong component. Among installation and maintenance errors, 
difficulties in adjusting limit switches and torque switches are outstanding. 
Some types of failure are difficult to account for in failure analysis. 
It is difficult to identify all of the failures of this kind, but the following 
provides a list of errors which occurred, but for which no systematic failure 
analysis procedure exists (as yet). 
loose parts jamming 5 
electrial circuit omissions or miswiring 5 
omission of essential procedural steps, 
or incorrect steps 3 
human decision errors with wide ranging effects 3 
established trip levels inappropriate 6 
water hammer affeots 3 
Also, there were some instances of problems present special difficulties in 
failure mode analysis. 
common dependence of several components on one 
service supply or environment 7 
- iå-
lailtifeilnre incidents 
ID thi« study, as in the previous one, the number af aaltiple fallere 
incidents was high when cenpared with esptctatioa. At the level of conaeeaeace 
repraaantcd by abnorasl occarrancc reporte, there ara at i l l a significant 
saauer of *, 5, 6, ana 7 fold failar* iocidenta <fig. 8 ) . 
Ihia patters hold* traa in epite af the fact that 
a> failure« to several csapoaents af the aaaa type, dae to 
th* aaas caaaa, han been treated aa aiagle failaraa. 
b) failaraa ahich ara a direct »naiaaaa« of earlier failar*«, 
are not coanted in arriving at the naaeer of independent 
failsrea. 
c) failarea ahieh do not contribute significantly to the 
consequences of the incident ham been ignored. 
asaeining the nature of the aoltiple failara incidenta reveals aereral 
diatinct type«. 
blovdovn incidents, in ahieh steaa i s released, ceasing 
defects in wuruuuding coaponents to be mea led , in 
Beat cases, and eaasiaf a large variety of safety esaponeats 
to be activated. 
anltiple haaan error«. It i s clear that i s sos» of these 
incidents there i s coapling between the errors. Once one 
haaan being baa aade an error, others tend to parpetaste i t . 
Boweer, the nature and »egret of interdepeadence of these 
errors i s difficult to deteraiae. 
- because of the »ay that these data are classified, i f 
single consonant fa i l s to »ark IHIBBBI I t s amliii i s 
inappropriate and ita operating procedure i s incorrect, the 
result i s counted as a doable fails**. This "elassifisatioa 
effect" i s significant in raising the naaber of 2 and J fold 
failure«. It does not contribute eignificantly to the naaber 
of •», S, 6 fold failaraa ete. 
•y far the largest proportion of failure types in the aultipls failure 
incidents are latent failures revealed daring special lneideat conditions, 
or revealed »hen safety equipment i s activated. 





• 3 / 
W V vx r 
UL& 11 10 
s . * 7 
NO. OP FAHUrW 
"St MODENT 
r% • rstTOOrUM OF MULflrU 
raatvLW H O B t l a l l 
-26-
Couclusions 
Conclusions as to the meaning and importance of the kind of results given 
here have been presented before (Rise—M-17**2). The additional data collected 
hare serve merely to reinforce those conclusions which are 
1) That design and other human errors are responsible for a significant 
number of failures and abnormal occurrences. 
2) Some "design error" type failures cannot be accounted for in tra-
ditional types of reliability analysis. 
3) Improvement in particular component reliability performance, in 
testing, and in standardisation, should be valuable in improving 
plant reliability, because a small number of component types are 
responsible for a large proportion of failures. 
*0 Multiple failure incidents play an unexpectedly large role in 
abnormal occurrences. Records of interrelationships between 
failures would be a useful addition to failure statistics data 
bases. 
In addition to these.remarks, some conclusions can be offered concerning 
the type of classification study attempted here. 
It would be useful to obtain some standardization of the terms used in 
classifying different types of failure, according to the way in which failures 
reveal themselves, the plant state at «he time of occurrence and/cr discovery, 
and the triggering mechanism of the failure. The classification used here is 
self consistent, but is different from schemes used elsewhere. 
The classification of primary causes of failure seems acceptable, and 
is similar to that use by the U8AEC (e.g. CCE-OS-001, 197'*). However the method 
of classification used here, attributing a failure to a single class, or using 
fractions to represent degree of responsibility for a particular causa, is 
•assy. Accepting that a failure may have several causes, and that the per-
centages of failures due to different causes may total to more t&an locje, 
»erne preferable. But if this method of classification is accepted, sow defi-
nition must be made of how important and unusual an effect oust be, before it 
is accepted as a contributing cause of failure. 
The classification of different failure causes into secondary categories 
was not particularly successful. Often there was insufficient information in 
the abnormal occurrence reports to make classification precise. And the cat-
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egoriee used here often overtapped. The information in such classification 
should not be used to derive percentages to which different causes are respon-
sible for failures. The information might be used to perform clustering studies, 
with the hope of finding more clearly identifiable types of failure. 
Uncertainty as to cause of failure should not be used as an excuse for 
assigning two causes to a particular failure. Instead, if there are several 
clearly alternative causes, this fact should be recorded explicitly (e.g. 
A/B aeans either cause A or cause B is involved, C H D/E means either cause 
C and E are together responsible, or cause E is responsible). Failure for which 
causes are unknown, should be recorded separately. Only in this way is it 
possible to interpret the meaning of failure cause data. 
A revised system of classifying different failures according to event 
sequences, is given in appendix 1. 
-28-
Affieodtx i. Classification of failure events 
Classificatici of the different kind of failure events which can enter 
into event sequences is useful and important, because it indicates the relevance 
of particular pieces of failure data to different reliability calculation models. 
In fact, as reliability models become more complex, more complex failure classi-
fications are required. The scheme introduced here ie therefore just a particu-
lar example of a range of possible schemes which differ in level of detail. 
The first distinction is made between failures which are caused by some 
external event or process, and those which arise with no apparent cause or for 
which the failure cause is an inherent property of the component. This second 
group is the one which has been called "random component failure" earlier in 
this note* These are called spontaneous failures here. Examples are the normal 
forme of bearing failure, relay contact failure etc., for which no specific cause 
can be described, or which cannot be prevented in normal engineering practice. 
Examples of typical causes in the first group of failures are design and instal-
lation errors, extreme environmental conditions, misoperation by an operator etc. 
A distinction which is equally important for obtaining a reliability model 
of failure consequences is whether the effects follow instantaneously from the 
failure, or whether the effects are gradual (e.g. slow leakage of some valuable 
material). 
When components operate Intermittently or only occasionally (such as safety 
systems) or with intermittent load (such as many pneumatic orhydraulic systems) 
a third distinction becomes important - whether the effects of the failure remain 
latent, or whether the consequences show themselves inraediately. In the case of 
a latent failure, a failure event occurs at some time. The component is reduced 
to a state in which it cannot operate according to specifications. When the 
component is called upon to operate (the failure is triggered), a "failure to 
operate" occurs. 
The definitions of the various failure types are illustrated in fig* 7* 
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eontinuing failure . 
external cause 





latent failure \ 
external cause ' 
/delayed consequence for plant 
internal or "normal" cause 
slow continuing consequence for plant \ x 
i internal or "normal" cause spontaneous 
instantaneous consequence for plant failure 
^internal or "normal" cause 
delayed consequences for plant 
Fig. 7* Definitions of failure classes. 
For latent failures, the stage at which the failure is discovered becomes 
important, especially for systems in which automatic continuous testing and 
periodic testing is performed. 
A latent failure may remain hidden due to the fact that the particular 
type of error is not exercised or triggered by the test inputs applied. These 
failures are called "ttntriggered", Equally* a failure may be triggered, but 
its effects may not be indicated because the failure alarm outputs and test 
measurements performed, are inadequate. These failures are called unmonitored. 
(Bee fig. 3 ) . 
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Stage at which failure pheaotwson occurs 

















Table lo. TeraiG used in describing latent and is«ediate failure sequences. 
k useful distinction in Judging the effectiveness of testing, i s that 
between actual failures and failures found under test . For actual failures 
consequences occur which affect the operation of the plant. The following 
relation i s true. 
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latent failure 
repealed automatically \ /" untriggered 
unrerealed J 
1 unnonitored 
revealed by test 
/ 
j ontriggered in test 
hidden failures J 
= revealed by start up I unaonitored in teat 
Fig. 8 . Types of latent failure. 
Actual failures = hidden failures 
+ failures in operation 
+ active failures 
+ aisoperations. not under test 
Finally, it is useful, in classifying oultiple failure sequences, to 
indicate whether a failure was initial (initiated the sequence), contributory 
(independent, but triggered as a result of the initial failure, or increasing 
the consequences of the initial failure), or consequent (caused by the initial 
failure). 
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